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In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
THO~f.A.S E. LUDLOW, EARL LU.D-
LOW, Otherwise Known as T. E. 
Ludlow, EDWARD B. S E L E N E, 
RUFUS _A_NDERSON, MARGARET 
D. HANSEN, Otherwise Known as 
Mrs. Heber Hanson, JO·HN ANGUS, 
MAYLAN CARTER, EDWARD M. 
BECK, Otherwise Known as Reed 
Beck, PAUL E. SWARTZ, EDWARD 
LUDLOW, and JOHN ANDERSON, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
COLORADO ANThfAL BY- PRO-
DUCTS COMPANY, a Corporation, 
Defendant and Ap.pellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
The record in this case and app~ellant's brief filed 
herein are voluminous, but the controlling fa.cts are 
neither complicated nor numerous. 
The plaintiffs own in severalty lands in a commun-
ity dc~:-otcd principally to farming at Benjamin in 
TJtah County, Utah. Most of the p~aintiffs have 
built and regidf\ in homes upon the lands owned by 
thoin. In about September, 1933, the defendant 
Colorado _.\nimnl By-Products Company, ·began the 
col10ction of CfU'CRf'·Ses of dead animals at' the p~rem" 
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ises at Benjan1in for ship·ment to other rendering 
plants operated by the defendant. The plant was 
originally constructed as a place for the collection 
of hides. In December, 1934 a cooker was placed in 
the plant to cook the meat and bones of dead ani .. 
mals and to manufacture therefrom fertilizer, bone. 
meal, poultry feed and tallow for soap manufacture. 
Bones were also collected and placed in a pile at the 
plant. In about February, 1935 the cookers were 
put in operation. (Tr. 193-4; Ab. 50). 
Dead animals were collected from Utah, Juab, San-
pete and W a~atch Counties and taken to the plant 
for the manufacture of the above mentioned pro~ 
ducts. The defendant also occasionally brought 
aged or crippled animals, bones and scraps from 
hutcher shops for use at the plant. 
P. H. Soble .. the president of the defendant con1~ 
pany thus states the amount of animal products 
that were cooked at the plant: Forty thousand 
( 40,000) to fifty thousand ( 50,000) pounds of bone 
per month: Fifteen thousand (15,000) to twenty 
thousand (20,000) pounds of meat p·er monil1, and 
ten thousand (10,000) to twelve thousand (12,000) 
·pounds of offal per month. ( Tr. 997-9; A b. 246 to 
247). Defendant received and cooked bet,veen fifty 
(50) ·and seventy-five (75) large animals per 
month, besides smaller animals such as dead pigs 
a.nd sheep (Tr. 98[); Ah. 242). 
On or about April 8, 1937 the plant was destroyed 
by fire. In about May or June, 1937, the company 
... ommenced the erection of a new plant at the site 
of the old one. Soon after the commencement vf thl) 
construction of the new p~ant some or a.ll of thr-
plaintiffs protested to the County CommissioT'el'R of 
TJtah County against its erection. P. H. Sohl0 'va~ 
at one of the meetings with the County Comtnis-
Rioner~ and assured the commissioners that if per-
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3 
mitted to erect and operate a new plant, it would be 
so operated as not to constitute a nuisance. (Tr. 
1002-3; A b. 247). 
This action was commenced on August 18, 1937. 
A temporary restraining order was issued 0~1 Aug ... 
ust 23, 1937. 'l'he trial was commenced on .April 3, 
1939 and continued for several days. On June 7, 
1939, Judge William L. Hoyt, who heard the cause, 
signed a memorandum of decision in "\vhich he gave 
a brief outline of the evidence m1d concluded tbat 
the defendant had been and was op·erating a nuis .. 
ance and that the P'laintiffs \vere entitled to appro-
priate relief, but that because the defendant had 
expended a large sum of money before the action 
was commenced, plaintiffs should not he granted 
injunctive relief, but that if so advised, plaintiffs 
might amend their pleading or file a supplementary 
complaint and be heard as to the da.mages that they 
had and would sustain. (Tr. 99). 
Thereafter a supplemental complaint was filed and 
evidence offered as to the damages sustained by 
plaintiffs, a.nd each of them. The judgment app·eal-
ed from was entered upon all the evidence. It "rill 
be noted that the judgment fixes the damages to 
which each of the parties is entitled and concludes 
that unless the aforesaid damages are paid by the 
defendant within sixty (60) days from date of en-
try of the decree herein, then plaintiffs are entitled 
to an injunction restraining defendant from operat-
ing said plant until said damages are paid. 
In our discussion we shall not attempt to follow the 
ord~r in which appellnnts have argued the ques-
tiong nl'ef.lent~d, a~ in our view it ,viii tend to clarify 
thP i~~rt~{~ and e11able this Court to better follow our 
nr'C'11P""rs'n1~ lvv· t3kir!.~' up first those questions of fa.ct 
nnd ]u,v ,~~hich ~re common to ali of the plaintiffs, 
R~ "':"'"~ dol~(l ni t:he trinl. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
rrHE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT DEFEND-
ANT'S PLANT IS A NUISANCE 
A nuisance is defined by our statutes as follows: 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, 104-56-1: 
''Anything which is injurious to health, or 
indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an 
obstruction to the free use of p~roperty, so 
as to interfere with the comfortable enjoy-
ment of life or property, is a nuisance and 
the subject of an action. Such action may 
he brought by any person whose property 
is injuriously affected, or whose personal 
enjoyment is lessened by the nuisance; and 
by the judgment the. nuisance may be en-
joined or abated, and damages may also be 
l'ecovered~'' 
There were numerous witnesses who testified in 
this case as to the nature of defendant's plant, and 
particularly concerning the obnoxious odors that 
emanated therefrom; and also that the plant was 
a breeding place for flies and rats. After most of 
the plaintiffs' evidence was in, the court, upon the 
request of defendant visited the plant. (Tr. 526). 
The following witnesses called by plaintiffs, in sub-
stance testified: 
S. I. GREER was employed by defendant from the 
time the site for the plant 'vas purchased in 1933. 
As ori_ginally constructed the plant was to be uRed 
for storing and collecting hides. Cookers were first 
put into the p~lant in 1934 and cooking of meat, bone~ 
and offal began ahout February 1, 1935. That "·hen 
~e learned cookers were to b,e put into the plant he 
resigned. That when the plant began cooking, 
horses, cows, pigs and sheep were cooked. That 
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5 
about si..~ty ( 60) horses and cows were cooked per 
month and "~ere gathered fronJ the counties of, Utah, 
Wasatch, Juab and Sanp·ete. The .animals were 
taken to the plant and there cut up and<skihned on 
the floor. The blood and refuse was drained into 
an open sump and there allo"'"ed to stand until it 
seeped a"~ay. In addition to the animal~ that 'vere 
collected, offal and intestines \Vere gathered from 
the slaughter yards in the vicinity and taken to 
the plant and used. That many of the aniinals 
broug-ht in "~ere decomposed and very nearly 
rotten. 
The odor from the cooking · of these animals goes 
off into the atmosphere and the sewage goes into 
the open sump at the p~lant. That the odors emana.t~ 
ing from the plant are. v~ry nauseatin,g a.nd extend 
as far as a mile from the plant. That. the distance 
the odor \Yi11 travel depends upon t:re ~onditiori- of 
the atmosphere. That flies by the millions .collect at 
the plant. That dry bones were always piled at the 
·plant. Tha.t the bone pile was a good breeding place 
for rats and many rats were in the hone pile and 
there made· nests and raised their young. That 
such condition always existed at the plant. '~ehat at 
times the plant is operated t\venty-four hours per 
day. That the plant takes care of about a ton of 
Rtuff daily. (Tr. 2 to 17). Tha.t the odor of thA 
plant gets into one's clothes and hair, and it is very 
rlifficult to remove the same. (Tr. 77). That he 
quit 'vorking, for the defendant company because of 
i.tR condition and its effect upon his health. (Tr. 28). 
THOMAS E. LUDLO,W, one of the plaintiffs, tes-
tified that his home is about-two hundred (200) rods 
west and ten nortn from the plant; that when the 
wind blows from the east and the cookers are in 
operation the odor from the plant makes it almost 
lmpossible to breathe; that it comes right into the 
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6 
house and wakes you up; that these odors corne to 
his place when the wind is blowing from the east, 
and occurs about t"rice a week; that the smell is 
hard to describe but it is much the same as decayed 
meat. (Tr. 101). 
FRANK SCOTT testified that he has been on a 
number of the farms in _the neighborhood of the 
plant and that about three years ago he was work-
tng on the roof of Rufus Anderson's home 'vhen 
the smell came ; that he was compelled to come off 
the roof; that it made him vomit; that while at Mr. 
Selene's farm he could not eat be·cause of the 
smell; that the smell was terrible, and much like 
tha.t of rotten dead animals. (Tr. 104-106). 
IDA SWARTZ thus described the odor coming 
from the defendant's plant: This odor is thick; it 
just doesn't go down; when you try to breathe it 
chokes you ; makes you sick; you can almost che'v 
the stuff; it makes you very sick to your stomach; 
it is absolutely imp~ossible with that odor to sit rlo"\vll 
and try to eat a meal; you feel like you are che,,-,ring 
a rotten, decayed animal when you sit down to din-
ner; it makes you deathly sick; wakes you up at 
night; wakes the children up at night. (Tr. 134). 
The odor came from the old and the new plants; 
the odor comes every day at times; at times 've 
have been compelled to leave our home because of 
the odor. (Tr. 135). It comes throu~hout ihe 
year, but is worse in the summer. Many flies come 
from defendant's plant; that since the defendant's 
plant was constructed they a.re troubled 'vith rats. 
(Tr. 136). 
JAMES ALBERT WEST testified that whenever 
the east wind blows the odor comes from the plant 
to his place; the odor smells liks a dead animal in 
your yard; it comes nearly every day, but is wors0 
~omP days than other~. (Tr. 171). It enm(\s into 
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the house; it is especially bad in the summer time ~ 
the flies at times are so thick you can't see out of 
the windo\Ys; the flies a.re blue and black blow-flies. 
(Tr. 172). 
EDWARD SELENE thus describes the odor from 
the plant: It is very rotten. On September 2tith 
it kept us up all night and I couldn't sleep; I have a 
good stomach but the odor makes me sick; my wife 
and children were also awakened by the odor; that 
has occurred on many occasions. (Tr. 182). 'I'he 
odor is there almost constantly. (Tr. 183). The 
defendant takes decayed meat into the plant all 
the time. (Tr. 196). 
HAZEL ANDERSON, who lives about four hun-
dred (400) rods from the plant described the odor 
thus: The odor from the plant causes a burning 
in your throat; wakes you up at night; the s1nell 
keeps you a'vake at night; it is very unpleasant; we 
have to keep the doors and windows closed to try 
to keep it out; the odor turns you sick. (Tr. 211). 
It comes about every day. (Tr. 212). Since the 
plant came 've have had trouble with Inany lng 
blow-flies. 
EDNA SEI_jENE thus described the odor: That 
rotten smell from the plant has a'vakened me and 
tny children at nights; t}1a.t the children have cried 
and cried at night; they couldn't sleep; that has 
heen the condition sjnce the ne'v plant was con-
~:trncted. The smell continues about a11 the time; 
n~pecially during- the SHmmer time. (Tr. 225). You 
can't on en your vtindo,vs; the odor is the most 
nan~eatin~ I have sm.elled; at times I am unable 
to Pat n1y meals beeausP of the Rmell. (Tr. 225). 
JOHN ANGUS testified that at tim-es the odor from 
defenda.nt 's plant was almost unbearable, especially 
'vh0n thP 'vind blo,,-rR fro1n th0 ea~t. It iF; worRe in 
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8 
the su1nmer ; that they are awakened by the odors. 
The odors occur nearly every day and about twice 
a week during the night time. (Tr. 257-8). 
PAUL E. SWARTZ described the smell. as. being 
the rottenest smell I have ever smelledt:it is thick; 
you can't breath.e; when it _comes in at .·meal tilnes 
you can't eat; a lot: of times the smell brings-"it all 
back~ ( Tr. 317). It sometimes comes for thirty 
minutes; sometimes two or three hours, sometimes 
all day; it generally comes· every day; it continues 
throughout the year. (Tr.· 318). '·· ., 
JOHN ANDERSON testified that the odor was 
very rotten; that it is present a part of every qay 
\vhen the cooker is in operation; 'arid the odors come 
into the house and \Yake you up at night. It is very 
nauseating. (Tr. 345-6). -, ,. 
j 
RUF·us ANDERSON described the odor as a sicl{-
ening smell; it. smarts the nostrils and throat; it 
sometimes comes three or four times a day, then it 
rnay miss a day or t,vo. (Tr. 345-6). 
HEBER EUGENE HANSEN described it as ve.ry 
nauseating; it is penetrating; it g·ets in your clothes 
and your clothes smell for hours· ·after it ceases. 
(Tr. 415-16). It is p·resent practically every day, 
but it is somewhat intermittent by a change in the 
wind. It comes at night and you cannot sleep. (Tr. 
416). 
JO,HN R. LUDLOW testified that at his home, 
about two hundred rods from the plant, the odors 
are the rottenest that I have ever con1e in contact 
\vith since they commenced cooki.ng; that the odor 
is that of dead animals; that the odor con1es vvhen 
the breeze blows from the east; it ocenrs nPa rly 
every day; that the odor is getting 'vorse. · (rrr. 
444). 
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LLOYD M. FARNER, a resident physician and 
surgeon and a deputy State health cominissioner 
testified to being at the plant; that the plant "\Vas 
very unsanitary; that offensive odors came from 
the plant; that after he had been at the plant a 
short time and returned to Provo he could still de .. 
teet the smell; probably from his clothes. (Tr. 
544). 
P. P. THOMAS, President of the Commercial Bank 
of Spanish Fork, testified that since the plant was 
constructed he had frequently passed along the 
highway and had observed the stink there and it 
smelled like a dead cow. (Tr. 861). 
CHARLES E. HAWKINS, a former county asses-
sor of Utah County, testified that he had been near 
defendant's plant a number of times, and that the 
odor that comes from the plant at certain times is 
practically unbearable to people that are not 
accustomed to it; that it has driven him away from 
his "\vork there; that he got sick and could not re-
main near the plant. (T.r. 9"40). 
THOl\rfAS M. ANDERSON testified that he was 
familiar 'vith the plant and gave testimony as to 
the depreciation in the value of plaintiffs' property 
by reason thereof. (Tr. 1011). 
MAYLAN CARTER testified that he owns land 
near defendant's plant and that it smells like a 
dead animal; that he couldn't build on his prop-
erty because of the smP-11. (Tr. 1043). 
Lu\.,VRENCE C .. JOHNSON describes the odor in 
the vicinity of the plant as very obnoxious; you 
enn 't staly in it. (Tr. 1057). 
Nearly all of the witnesses testfied that the odor 
from thP plant had not improved after it was 
claim0d by defendant that it attempted to ·control 
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the odor by some slight changes 1n the construc--
tion. 
In addition to above, see testimony of Rufus 1\J.! .. 
derson, ( Tr. 1121) ; and tha.t of Hazel Anderson, 
( Tr. 1113) ; also Edwin Selene, ( Tr. 1118). 
Most of the witnesses called by the defendant ~es .. 
tified that there were odors in and about the plant, 
and some of them testified that such odol's were 
very obnoxious. See testimony of Dr. Joseph 
Hughes, who was called as an expert by the de-
fendant. (Tr. 575, 579, 580). Also defendant'~ 
·witness John W. Staker, (Tr. 650). 
We have heretofore pointed out that the trial judg<.l 
before whom the case was heard, visited the prem-
ises during the trial. In the light of such fact, the 
.rule that the trial judge is in a better position to 
deter1nine the facts than is a reviewing Court, is 
especially applicable. The only conclusion permisM· 
r:,ible is that the trial court upon his visit to the 
plant found from first hand information, the facts 
to he as claimed by plaintiffs and as testified to by 
them and their witnesses. 
In the foregoing brief snmma.ry of the evidence we 
have referred to the transcript. using the page 
number sho,vn in the index and at the top of the 
page rather than the page numbers written on the 
bottom of the transcript, 'vhich la.tter numbers are 
referred to in the abstract. The abstract fails to 
fully convey the import of plaintiffs' testimony; 
especially as to the nature, intensity a.nd effect of 
the o-dors that emanated from the plant; the con-
dition of the open sump at the plant and the flies 
and rats that are drawn to and breed at the plant. 
In light of that fact we earnestly ur,g.e, espec.ially 
on the question of whether or not defendant 'R pla11t 
constitutes a nuisance, that this Court examine the 
transcript, as reliance on the ahstra.ct 'vill not pre .. 
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sent the real picture. Defendant offered some evi-
dence tending to show that other rendering plants 
were constructed near places where people reside 
and that no serious objection 'vas made to the same. 
Such testimony, ho,vever, is of little or no value. 
The fact that a rendering plant is located a.t the 
Cudahy Packing- Company in North Salt Lake 
where only fresh mea.ts are handled, and one at 
Twin Falls where no considerable amount of 
offensive odors are emitted does not change the fact 
that defendant's plant at Benjamin is so constructed 
or operated, or both, that it makes living in its 
vicinity next to impossible for normal people. 
Some evidence "\Vas offered toucl1ing the construc-
tion of the Benjamin plant and that it -,vas similar 
to the construction of other plants and therefore 
should not give off the odors complained of, but 
not\nthstanding such evide:r1ce, the fact ren1ains 
that the Benjamin plant, ever since cookers were 
]nstalled and put into operation, has almost con-
stantly given off these offensive odors and attract-
ed flies and rats, "rhich has seriously affected the 
comfort, if not the health, of those who are re-
quired to reside or 'vork in the vicinity of the plant. 
That is the concluRion of the trial court and we 
submit that no other conclusion is permissible under 
the evidence. 
The defendant offered evidence tending to show 
that some of the plaintiffs had manure in their 
yards and that onP of them, Thomas Ludlow, had 
part of the remains of aead animals in his yard. 
Ruch evidence merelv establishes the fact that the 
n.l'(la in and nbout d.efendant's plant is a farming 
r.()mmunity, subject to the conditions found gen .. 
f\r~=tllv in such commnnities. Thomas Ludlow testi-
fi0r1 .thnt hP either buried or burned any animals 
th.nt mny die on his premises within a short time 
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after they died. (Tr. 831). No such precautions 
were taken by the defendant. 
All of the evidence shows that la.rge quantities, 
sometimes several tons, of the bones of dea,d ani-
mals were customarily stored at defendant's plant. 
Defendant also offered in evidence a number or 
photographs of the premises of some of the plain-
tiffs. Many of the photographs were taken on 
April 3rd, when it is quite apparent that the yards 
bad not dried up and the accumulation of winter 
manure had not yet been removed. It is also 
apparent that the photographs were taken only of 
those parts of the premises as were most unsight-
ly. It might be that the surroundings of some of 
the ho1nes of plaintiffs are not as sightly as could 
be desired, but they are none the less their homes 
where they must live, and. it ill becomes the de-
fendant to insist that because the surroundings of 
some of the homes are not as sightly as they mig'ht 
he, defendant is at liberty to so pollute the atu1os-
phere that during both day and night plaintiffs 
are compelled to suffer the discomfort of breath-
ing the foul air -caused by defendant's p~ant or give 
up their homes and farms. 
So long as defendant merely maintained unsightly 
premises and stored tons of bones plaintiffs did not 
complain, but " 7hen defendant, by its cooking opera-
tion of partially decayed animals and offal, so .POl· 
luted the air that plaintiffs could not live in their 
homes in comfort and were confronted with the fact 
that such conditions would continue indefinitely, 
they brought this aetjon for injunctive relief. and 
having been denied that relief they sought dan1-
ages, the only recourse available to them to redrP.s~ 
the '\Vrong·s complained of. 
Defendant also offered evidence tending to show 
that at times when animal~ died they were not 
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properly burned or otherwise disposed of. 'l,he 
fact that someone ".as derelict in such pa.rticular is 
no legal justification for defendant maintaining a 
nuisance, such as is shown by the evidence in this 
case. Our statutes, 
R. S. U. 1933, 103-41-1 provide that: 
'' \rhatever is dangerous to human life or 
health and \Yhatever renders soil, air, wa.ter 
or food impure or un\vholesome, are de-
clared to be nuisances and to be illegal, 
and every person, either owner, agent or 
occupant, having aided in creating or con-
tributing to the same, or \vho may support, 
continue or retain any of them, is guilty 
of a misdemeanor.'' 
While in this case doctors were called and testified 
that the odors about defendant's plant were not 
likely to spread disease germs, none of them had 
the temerity to testify tha.t such air is pure and 
wholesome. If, as the evidence shows, the air at 
times becomes so obnoxious as to cause nausea, 
make it impossible to eat and retain a meal, and to 
keep p·eople awake at night, such facts do not re-
quire the testimony of a physician to convince a 
court that such air is both impure and unwhole-
some, and is calculated to injure the health of one 
\vho is compelled to breathe the same. Such facts 
nr0 matters of common knowledge of which courts 
w·ill take judicial notice. 
Defendant also contended that because the Union 
Pacific Railroad Company is in close proximity to 
the plant, the Denver & Rio Grande Railway and 
a pea vinery are within about a mile, the Utah-Idaho 
Sugar Company about two miles, and the Columbia 
Stf'Pl Cornpnny about ten miles from defendant's 
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plant; and because defendant's plant is loca.ted on a 
site formerly used for a brick yard, the place where 
the plant is located is an industrial area and there-
fore plaintiffs have no leg.al cause to complain. 
Particular stress is placed upon the pea vinery 
located about a mile west of defendant's plant, bew 
cause unpleasant odors, at some times of the year, 
emanate from that plant. Even though it be con-
ceded that the pea vinery is a nuisance that is no 
justification for the defendant maintaining an 
additional nuisance. Moreover, the clear pre-
ponderance of the evidence shows that the odors 
from the pea vinery do not reach the premises of 
the plaintiffs. 
The dividing line between an industrial area and 
a residential area, especially in the absence of a 
zoning ordinance, is of necessity impossible of ex-
act determination, but even though the area. where 
defendant's·plant is located can be designated as an 
industrial area, still such fact does not excuse the 
defendant from maintaining a nuisance .. One may 
.., be guilty of maintaining a nuisance in an indus-
trial area. In the case of 
Kinsman, et al, v. Utah Gas & Coke Corn-
/ pany, 53 Utah 10; 177 P. 418, 
it appears that notwithstanding the defendant ·com-
pany made every effort to prevent offensive odors· 
from escaping from the gas plant, and where 
periodically and at times continuously offensive 
and noxious odors were coming from the gas pla.nt 
and entering upon the premises of the plaintiffs 
and into their homes, and notwithstanding no 
serious sickness resulted to the occup,ants of the 
adjoining premises, this Court held that it had no 
doubt hut that the plaintiffs were disturbed from 
the full enjoyment of their rights and were en-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
titled to reco~er because of the acts of the defend-
ant in operating the gas plant. 
To tJ1e san1e effect are 
Thackery v. Union Portland Cement Coin-
pany, 64 Utah 437; 2'31 P. 813. 
No other or different doctrine is announced in the 
case of 
Dahl v. Utah (lil R.efining' Company, 'll 
Utah 1; 262 P. 269. 
In the Dahl case this Court cites with approval a 
number of cases from other jurisdictions and other 
authorities. The following doctrine is there quoted 
with approval: · 
"The la'v relating to private nuisances is 
a la\\.,. of degree, and usually turns on a 
question of fact, whether the use is reason-
able or not under the circumstances. No 
hard and fast rule controls the subject, for 
a use that is reasonable under one set of 
facts would be unreasonable under ~n­
other. Whether the use of pTope-rty to 
carry on a lawful business, which creates 
smoke or noxious gases in excessive quan-
tities, amounts to a nuisance, depends on 
the facts of each particular case. Loca-
tion, priority of occupation, and the fact 
that the injury is only occasional, are not 
conclusive, but are to be considered in con-
nection with all the evidence, and the in-
ference drawn from an the facts proved 
'Yhether the controllinp- fact exists that the 
n~e is unreasonable. If that fact is found 
a nuisance is established, and the plain-
tiff j~ entitled to relief in some form." 
"Whether the n~e of nroperty by one per-
Ron i~ reasonable, with reference to the 
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con1fortahle enjoyment of his own prop ... 
erty by another, generally depends upon 
many and varied facts, such a.s location, 
nature of the use, chara·cter of the neigh-
borhood, extent and frequency of the injury, 
the effect on the enjoyment of life, health. 
and property, and the like.'' 
'' vVhat an1ount of annoyance or inconven-
ience caused by oth~rs in the lawful use 
of their property will constitute a nuisance, 
is largely a question of degree dep·ending 
on varying circumstances, and is incapable 
of exact definition. The injury or annoy. 
ance must be of a real and substantial 
nature, and the pertinent inquiry ordin-
arily is \\'hether the acts or conduct proved 
are such as materially to interfere 'with 
the ordinary comfort, physically, of hun1an 
existence,' or are materially detrimental to 
the reasonable use, or value of the prop-
erty." 
The authorities generally are to that effe-ct. 
The facts in the Dahl case, supra, are not com-
parable to the case in hand. The odors tliere com-
plained of were the ordinary odor of g.as and oil, 
which is common and usual in many public places, 
The odor emanating from defendant's plant is, as 
described by the witnesses, that of de·ca.ying meat., 
1nuch the same as that 'vhich comes from a rottPn 
animal in your yard. lt is difficult to conceive of 
a more offensive odor or one more calculated to 
destroy the comfort and enjoyment of the life of 
those who are ·compelled- to endure it. The la,v ... 
making power of this State has so recognized such 
to he the fact by making it a nuisa.nce to put the 
carcasses of any dead animal into any river, lakr, 
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pond, strPet, alley or publie high,Yay, or road in 
conunon use; or "\Yho attempts to destroy the same 
by fire within one-fourth of a mile of any city or 
town. 
R. S. U. 1933, 103-41-6. 
In the Dahl rase the oil refining company 'vas 
t·stablished in 1900, "\Yhich must have been ahout a 
quarter of a century before plaintiff in that case 
broug·ht her action. The case was decided by this 
Court on June 20, 1927. 
In this case plaintiffs sought the aid of the County 
Commissioners of Utah County to p·revent the re-
building of defendant's plant very soon after they 
learned that it "\Yas to be reconstructed. Such action 
on the part of the plaintiffs was doubtless because 
they had exp~erienced the obnoxious odors during 
the time the cookers were being operated in the 
original plant. The president of defendant com-
pany assured the County Commissioners that the 
ne\\"~" plant would he so constructed and operated as 
to eliminate the odors. That was not done. 
Substantially all of the 'vitnesses \vho testified 
concerning- the odors emanating from the new 
plant testified that such odors 'vere as strong and 
offensive as were those which emanated from the 
original plant. Some testified that the odors eman-
ating from the reconstructed plant were worse than 
those V\7hich came from the old plant and that they 
'Yerp gettjn.~ '\vorse. Dou htless as defendant ex-
tended its business and hanled in and cooked more 
partially decomposed animals· and offal, the odors 
naturally would be stronger and more continuous. 
Tn the Dahl case the eviden·ce sho,ved that the de-
fendant company bad used every known means in 
the construction and operation of its plant to pre-
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)vent the escape .of fumes, gases or offensive odors 
from the plant. In this case a feeble attempt was 
made to show that defendant too had attempted to 
prevent the escap·e of odors. A witness was called 
who was familiar with the Cudahy Packing Com .. 
pany at North Salt Lake and its operation. In the 
Cudahy plant however only fresh meat is used, 
while in defendant's plant the carcasses of animals, 
a.s the court found, that have been dead a.t least a 
day or two were taken into the plant. That such 
animals, especially during. the summer time, wonld 
be partially decayed cannot be seriously doubted. 
Mr.. Greer, a former employee of defendant com .. 
pany, testified that some of the meat used by de .. 
fendant was rotten when it arrived at the plant. 
The Cudahy Packing Company ha.s constructed a 
pip~line for about two miles to carry off the waste 
materials and odors from the plant. The defend ... 
ant permits the waste materials from its plant to 
drain into an op~en sump next to the plant and 
thP-re remain until it evaporates or seeps away. 
More significant than either of these facts is, 
aecording to defendant itself, a rendering plant 
can be constructed and operated so .that no appre-
ciable odor vlill emanate therefrom, and yet the evi-
d~nce here sho,vs that this plant is not so construct .. 
ed or operated, as otherwise the obnoxious odors 
coming from the p~lant 'vould not be there. 
Other cases which support or tend to support the 
fact that defendant's plant is a nuisance are: 
-McClury v. Highland Boy . Gold Mining 
Company, 140 Fed. 951. 
Green v. Sun Company, 32 Pa. Super. Ct. 
521. 
Millet v. Minnesota Crushed Stone Com .. 
pany, 144 Minn. 475; 177 N. W. 641; 
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179 N. "\V. 682; notes in 9 L. R. A. (N. 
S.) 695. 
20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 466. 
31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 899. 
3 A. L. R. 312. 
Coker v. Berge, 9 Ga. 425; 54 Am. Dec. 347. 
Block v. Batemore, 149 Md. 39; 129 Atl. . 
887. 
Trowbridge v. Lansing, 237 Mich. 402. 
50 A. L. R. 1014, 212 N. W. 73. 
Lennon v. Butte, 67 Mont. 101; 214 Pac. 
1101. 
Templeton v. Williams, 59 Ore. 160; 36 
L. R. A. (N. S.) 468; 116 P. 1062. 
Paris . v. Philadelphia, 63 Pa. Sup. Ct. 41; 
50 l\. L. R. 1020. 
Hall v. Carter, 157 S. · W. 461. 
Jacob v. Bingham, 227 S. W. 249. 
PL~'-\INTIFFS' CAUSES Q:F ACTION ARE NOT 
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITA-
TIO,NS. 
We have heretofore pointed out that the site upon 
which defendant's plant "\Vas constructed was pur-
chased in April or May, 1933. In September, 1933, 
!·be defendant bega.n using the plant for- collecting 
dead animals to be shiprped to other plants owned 
by the defendant. In December, 1934, the _defend-
ant installed rendering equipment and it was not 
-until about February 1, 1935 that the plant began the 
operation of cooking and rendering the carcasses oi 
dead anitnals. .A~bout April 8, 1937, the original 
plnnt burned do,vn and a.bout 1\t!ay or June of 1937 
'vork 'vas commenced on the reconstruction of a uew 
plant on the site of the old plant. 
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The complaint in this action was filed on .A .. ugust 
19, 1937. The defendant pleads in bar of the action 
R. S. ·u. 104-·2-24 and 104-2-30. 'I'he forn1er section 
provides that an action for trespass upon or injury 
~o real p·roperty must be ctrmm~nced vvitl1in three 
years. The latter section provides that any action 
not otherwise p_rovided-- for -in the code must be 
commenced within four years. It will be observed 
that plaintiffs brought their action within three 
yea.rs from the time defendant installed its equip-
Jnent for the operation of._~ rendering plant and 
that the rendering plant was not placed in opera-
tion until about Februa.Ij 1, 1935, while the action 
was comm~nced .Qn August 19, 1937; that the orig-
inal plant 'was destroyed hy fire in April, 1937, and 
the c_onstructiol). of the present plant was barely 
commenced when this actio,n. was .filed. The p-rin-
cipal cause of th.e ,wro.!lgs complained of by these 
plaintiffs was arid "is __ the q:pe~ation ·of the render-
ing pJant. Moreover,' in any event the pleaded 
statute of limitations is. not available to the de-
fendant under the fa.cts in this case . 
. _. Stree.t v-. -. Northport .. ~linin-g & Smelting 
Co. (Wash;),'70\ P. 266.-
Wright and Others v. illrich, 40 Colo. 437; 
91 p. 4:),. . ' ; ' 
"\Vestern. Union Telegraph Co. v. -Moyle, 51 
Kans. 203.; 22 P-. 895.: ·: 
Sodeburg v. Chica.go, etc. ~ailway Co., 167 
_ IlL_ 123; 149 N. W. 82. 
Morey · v. Essex ·County, 94 N. J. L. 
427, 439; 110 Atl.. _905. -. 
~ . ,~~nsm~p.- :v. ,Ut~h G~~ ~ ~- Cok~ Co., 53 Utah 
-... 10~ 177 P. 418~. -
. . ' . .., ·' 
·· Thackerv v. Union Portland Cement Com-
. pariy, 64 Ut~h,-437~;· ~31 P. 813, 
a.nd cases there ri ted. . 
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THERE IS NO MISJOINDER OF P~RTIES 
PLAINTIFF. 
It is said in 
Bancroft's Code Practice and Remedies, 
\T ol. 2, Page 1081, Section 7 43, that: 
''The general rule in actions of equit-
able cognizance is that all persons material-
ly interested either legally or be·neficially 
in the subject matter of the suit must he 
made parties either as plaintiffs or de--
fendants so that a complete decree may be 
made, binding upon all parties. And it is 
said that although courts of la\v require no 
n1ore parties than those immediately inter-
ested in the subject matter, in equity all 
persons, including those remotely inter-
ested therein, may be joined and are often 
necessary parties.'' 
In the same volume at Page 1112, Section 760, it 
is said: 
''Where, therefore, there is a community of 
interest among all of the claimants in the 
questions of law and fact involved, in the 
~~·en·~rnl controversy, or in kind and form 
of relief demanded by or against each in-
dividual metnber of a numerous body, juris ... 
diction should be exercised although there 
i:~ no common title nr community of right 
or o£ interest in the subject matter among 
th~ individuals.'' 
In ] 4 R. C. L., Page 3.28, ·Section 29,. 
it. is said tha.t: 
'' Conrt~ of equity have always exercised 
n sound di~(Jreti on in determining ,vhether 
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parties are properly joined in a suit, with 
the object of the most efficient. administra-
tion of justice. The "joinder therefore 
a.s ·complainants of persons who suffer 
special injury by reason of the proximity 
of their prop~erties to a nuisance which it 
is sought to restrain l.s proper. In a sim-
ilar manner owners of . separate parcels of 
real property 1nay unite in a suit to enjoin 
the repairing or rebuilding of a wooden 
building within the fire limits of a muni-
cipality, whereby their· p~roperty will be 
diminished in value, and subjected to in-
creased danger of destruction by fire. 
Their ·common danger and common inter-
est in the relief sought authorize them to 
join- in one· action.'' 
It will serve no useful purpose to multiply the 
.authorities or· ·cite cases from other jurisdiction~ 
because the law is settled in this jurisdiction by the 
cases of 
·Kinsman v. Utah Gas & Coke Co., 53 Utah 
10; 177 P. 418 and 
Wasatch Oil Refining Company v. Wade, 
92 Utah 50; 63 P. (2d) 1070. 
As we understand counsel for the defendant they 
are not relying .. so much on r their claim of mis-
joinder of parties pla~ntiff so long as they· .were 
seeking injunctive relief, ·but \vhen the court below 
denied plaintiffs' injunctive relief the case was at 
an end and the court co-uld'not properly proceed to 
hear or determine the question of damages, if any, 
sustained by . the plaintiffs. . The same. question 
'vas urged and the same argument submitted to this 
Court (in which one of counsel for the defendant 
herein participated) artd decided against defend·· 
, I 1 "' 
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ant's contention in the Wasatch Oil Refining Com-
pany case, sup·ra, after an able and thorough 
presentation of the question of whether or not 
in a proper action for injunctive relief dam-
ages may be a'varded after the injunctive relief 
l1as been denied. In the Wasatch Oil Refining 
Company case, supra, this Court reaffirmed the 
doctrine announced in the Kinsman case wherein 
it is said that: 
"In an equity action where the prayer is 
for both_ specific and general relief the 
court having acquired jurisdiction of thA 
parties and the subject matter will retain 
that jurisdiction until justice has been 
done, although the equitable relief is de-
nied, especially in this State where there 
is but one form of civil action.'' 
''Where fifty-nine persons bringing an 
action to restrain as a nuisance the opera-
tion of a gas plant and for general relief, 
each having sep1arate and individual claims 
or right of action for damages growing 
out of the same trespass on the part of 
the defendant company, the only separate 
issue being the amount of compensation due 
each plaintiff, the court should, on deny-
ing equitable relief allow the plaintiffs 
to a.m~nd and determine the amount to 
'vhich each plaintiff is entitled, without re-
quiring them to bring separate actions.'' 
The foregoing quotations are from the sylla.bi in 
the KinRmnn ca~~ a . .nd reflect the opinion of thP 
Court. In the course of that op-inion this Court 
quoted from 
Pomeroy Eq. Jur., Page 354, where it iR 
~nin: 
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'' vVhenev~r . th~ · true spirit of the ref orin · .. 
procedure. has b·e/en accepted and followed 
the courts ·Jiot' on1y permit regal and equit-
able causes of action to· be joined and legal 
and equitable -r-emedies to-'- be: prayed for 
and obtairied,rbut will~.~g.rant :pu'rely legal 
relief of . .posse_ssion,: compensa.te damages, 
peCU:J!if!T)! reqoveries __ andi_t)J.B 1~1:}~~' ..in addi-
tio~ to-_or::_jP::. pla.~e .gJ:_ th~ ~PftGific equitable 
relief denied. In a great vari.ety of cases _ 
which would not have ·come within the 
· scope· of th~ gerlerallprinciple as it was re-
garded and' acted ll:pop. by.'oriiinal equity 
jurisd~~tion and in ;which-' therefore a court 
. of: equity wquld.''have refrained from exer-
cising· ·such· i .Jiir~sdi~tioll:. '' · · 
In .the' W'asfttCh 'on Refining , .Comp<any case v. 
Wade, supra-,· it .is~ said that t:Q.e·· Kinsman case can-
not :now be disregarded a:IldJ we. have no desire to 
rev_e~~e~:or: qualify. any:,of the p~inciples for which 
it stands. ·· It has been· .affirmed and reaffirmed as 
• • • ..J ' • -. • 
to one, or ~:more. 'of lhe~ principles announced :there-
in in, the following· :eases in this- Court: 
Utah oa: Refini4g 'Q,O~~Ilpy 1 ~ •. :Qistf:ipt 
CQurt, 60_'V"tah 428"; ·2u9 p. 624 ... · 
Thackery .. v.' Unio:q Portl~<l: C;~rp~:p.t~;ICorn­
p·~ny, ._6~ Uta~_437 ;:231_ P. _813~_, 
Mads~n.- v. Bonneville Irri-gation Dist.,. 65 
. ·utah 571; 239-.P~ 781. ~ ' · ·r. 
Trenchard. v.-. Reay, ~10 Utah 19; 25.7 P. 
1046. ~ . ,. ' ' 
McMoneg.al v. ~r~tcb.·· Loan~& .. Tillst Gom-. 
J•·.t• 
~- . , . ~ pany, .75 Ut~:b- .. 470; .28q_ P. ~30 ... ,. . t-~ 
Norback v. Board of Directors of Church ; .. !-
• ~ i ~~t~xtsio~,.Sp.G~Qty, ~Q~·Uta~ 5.0~;. 37 .. p. ( 2d) 339. ' ' . ' . ' ~ ' 
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'l"he facts in this case briug it squarely \\'ithin the 
la\v announced in the 1\:.insman and Wasatch Oil 
l{efining Uo1npauy cases, supra . 
.At the conclusion of the evidence offered in sup-
port of the claim for injunctive relief the court 
iound that the defendant con1pany in the construc-
tion and operation of its plant had created and was 
maintaining a nuisance and that plaintiffs were 
entitled to appropriate relief. However, in light 
of the fact that defendant had expended a large 
sum of money, approximately Thirty Thousand 
Dollars, according to the president of the· company, 
and the further fact that plaintiffs had not acted 
pron1ptly in seeking equitable relief, the trial court 
refused to grant the injunctive relief, but held that 
plaintiffs were entitled. to appropriate relief be-
cause of the wrongs complained of, and upon fur-
ther hearing a\Yarded damages \Vhich are clearly 
in lieu of injunctive helief. 
The facts in this case do not bring it within the 
doctrine of most of the cases cited and relied upon 
by the defendant, but \Ve shall not undertake the 
task of reviewing those cases in this brief, as most 
of them have already been considered by this Court 
in the Wasatch Oil Refining Company case, supra, 
and a conclusion reached contrary to the conten-
tion here made by the defendant. It is clea.r here 
that the court below refused the injunction and sub-
stituted therefor the damages sustained and to be 
~ustained by the p1aintiffs upon the authority of a 
doctrine repeatedly announced by this Court, and 
in order to save the defendant from the complete 
loss of its investment in its plant. It m.ay be con-
ceded that some of the cases cited by the defend-
ant, especially from jurisdictions which have not 
adopted the reform procedure, are not in accord 
·with the approved procedure in this jurisdiction, 
hut as already indicateil. tl1i~ Court. haR refused to 
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follow such doctrine, although the matter has been 
repeatedly presented to it. Before leaving this 
phase of the case it may be noted that defendant 
in its brief has considerable to say about it having 
been denied a jury trial. A jury trial was not de-
manded by defendant in the court belo\v, nor did 
the defendant join in plaintiffs' request for a jury. 
Had the defendant so requested it may well be that 
the trial court would not have denied the request 
1nade by the plaintiffs. 
In the Kinsman case this Court said that ''the 
court may call to its assistance a jury to determine 
the amount, if any, of such damages as in other 
equitable proceedings.'' 
In the 'Vasatch Oil Refining Company case it is 
said: 
''Where ho,vever the case is one of equity 
ju ~isdiction and the question of damages 
is before the court, to be granted if proved. 
either in substitution for or in addition 
to equitable relief, the denial of a jur~r trial 
is not the denial of any legal right. W ein-
ing-er v. l\{etropolitan Life Ins. Co., 359 
Ill. 584, 195 N. E, 420, 98 A. L. R. 169; 
R.hoRdes Y. Mr N a.m_ara, 135 !!Iich. 644, 98 
N. ""'.V. 392:, Jacob v. Schiff (Sup.), 149 
N.Y. S. 273.'' 
PL.AINTIFFS ARE ENTITLJ1JD TO DAMAG~8 
IN AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO THE D~E­
PRECIATIO·N IN THE VALUE OF THEIR 
REAl.J PROPER.TY O~CCASIONED BY 'rJT~~~ 
OPERATION OF DEFEND~t\NT'S PLANT. 
In its brief defendant contends that the trial court 
did not adopt the proper measure of damages in 
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that the defendant might diseontinue the operation 
of its plant. So far as this record discloses there 
is nothin~g- in the evidence to support such a con-
tention. On the contrary, all of the evidence sho"r~ 
that the defendant company intends to continue per-
manently to operate the plant as it is and has been 
operated. Notwithstanding defendant, through its 
president, assured the County Commissioners of 
Utah County that the plant would be so constructed 
and operated as not to be a nuisance, the evidence 
shows that it is a nuisance; and notwithstanding 
the defendant claims tha.t it is constructed and 
operated as well as it can be constructed and oper-
ated, the fact remains that it is and will continue 
indefinitely to be a nuisance. The plant is con-
structed of cement and brick, which would indicate 
that it is intended to be op·erated indefinitely. (Tr. 
811). The fact that defendant has expended, 
according to the testimony of its president, the sum 
of Thirty Thousand Dollars is also an indicatiOn 
that the p~lant is a permanent establishment. Under 
such circumstances the authorities teach that the 
plaintiffs are entitled to recover for permanent 
damages. In the case of Tha.ckery v. Union Port-
]and Cement Company this Court in discussing a 
similar question quoted with approval the follow-
ing language from 
4 Sutherland Damages (4th Ed.), Section 
1046: 
''The apparent discr.epaneies in the Amer-
ican caRes on this subj€'ct may perhaps be 
reduced by supposing· that where the nuis-
ance consists of a structure of a permanent 
nature and intended hy thP defP-ndant to 
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be so, or of a use or invasion of the plain-
tiff's property~ or a deprivation of soine 
benefit appurtenant to it for an indefinitely 
long period in the future, the injured party 
has an option 'to complain of it as a per-
n1anent injury and recover damages for 
the whole tin1e, estimating its du1·at1on 
according to the defendant's purpose in 
creating or continuing it, or to treat it as 
a temporary wrong to be contpensated for 
while it continues; that is, until the act 
complained of beeomes rightful by grant, 
condemnation of property or ceases by 
abatement.'' 
In the Thackery case, supra, this Court said tha· 
''No good reason appears, therefore, why, 
if the parties so elect either by agreement 
or by acquiescence, the court should not 
permit a recovery of ·comp·ensation as for 
a permanent injury in one action. Such 
would necessarily tend to lessen litigation 
and once for all determine the respective 
rights of the parties. Many of the States, 
as I understand the decisions, permit that 
to be done. That right was recognized by 
this Court in Kinsman v. Gas Co., 53 Utah 
10' 177 p. 418. ' ' 
In the Kinsman case this Court sa.id: 
''The cause is therefore remanded with 
direetions to the District Court to a llo"" 
amendments to the pleadings if desired and 
to pro~eed to hear testimony and detertnine 
the p·a.st and future damages to each plain .. 
tiff by reason of the continued a.nd np.,.-
pet)lal operation of the company's plant 
at its present capacity, and to make sep-
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urate findings upon ~uch issue of fact and 
enter judg1nent or judgments accordingly.'' 
Iu ~0 R. C. L., Page 4G3, Section 81, 
it is said that: ,i~ ~ 
~·If private nuisance is of such a character 
that its continuance is necessarily, an in-
jury and it is of a permanent character 
that will continue \Yithout change from 
any cause by human labor and dependent 
for change in no- contingency of which the 
la ""'" can ,~take notice, then the dan1ages are 
original and according to the weight of 
authority, a right of action at once exists 
to recover the entire damage, past and 
future, and one _recovery will be a bar to 
any subsequent action.'' 
It ~ay be not-ed- that at the trial after the ·lower 
court had announced it w-ould deny injnnctive re-
lief but would permit an _ ~me_ndment and receive 
evidence touching the question of any damages that 
plaintiffs might establish, the first witness called 
by the plaintiffs touching such damages was P. P. 
Thomas, who testified a.s to the depreciation in the 
market value of plaintiffs' pre·misei oecasioiied by 
the. :construction' a:nd operation of the plant. No 
objection was :fnacle by defendant nt tne trial to the 
effect that the proper measure of damages was not 
the depreciation in the value ·of plaintiffs' property 
, 0n a.ccount of the construction and operation of the 
· de-Pendant's plant. Plail\tif.fs'. evidence was, after 
Injunctive relief was denied, directed to that issue, 
~ as'·was ·also -the: evidence ofthe defendant. The case 
; having- been: tried upon such theory and the defend-
ant having acquiesced therein, under the doctrine 
announced by thf' Thackerv rase, supra, the defend-
ant may' not now be heard to contend that the wrong 
m.Ansnre of damag·e~;f "~Rs adopted· hy the trfal court. 
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If the paintiffs "'Were to bring an action for any dam-
age sustained by them, or either of them, after the 
supplementary complaint "'\Vas filed and trial had 
thereon, a complete defense to any such action 
would be that the cause having been tried up,on such 
theory the plaintiffs may not recover any other or 
additional damages because of the operation of the 
plant in the manner that it has been operated. The 
darna.ges caused by the construction and operation 
of the plant has forever been set at rest by this 
action. In such particular this case falls squarely 
vvithin the rule announced in the Thackery case, 
supra. Other cases in this and other jurisdictions 
which lend support to such view are the following: 
Utah Oil Refining Co. v. District Court of 
Salt Lake County, 60 Utah 428; 209 P. 
624. 
11:ast v. Sapp, 140 N. Ca.r. 533; 53 S. E. 350. 
5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 379. 
111 Am. St. Rep. 864. 
6 Ann. Cas. 384. 
I..~. R. A. 1916-E, note at Page 1069, 
27 A. L. R., note at P·age 161. 
37 A. L. R. 812. 
Sutherland Damages, 4th Ed., Sees. 1046-
1047, and cases there· cited. 
THERE W.A.S NO ER~R·OR IN REFUSING T(J 
AD1\1JT EVIDENCE. 
On page 90 of defendant's brief it is urged that 
the trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence 
touching the reappraisal of lands and improye. 
ments in Utah County, Utah, under the direction 
of the State Tax Commission of Utah. We are at 
a loss to understand upon what theory defendant 
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claims the proffered evidence was comp~etent. It 
is, so far a.s 've can ascertain, the uniform hold-
ing of the courts that the assessed value of land by 
a public officer for the p.urpose of taxation is not 
competent to sho'Y market value. 
''The assessed value of land when it is 
made by the assessor without the interven-
tion of the land owner, is not admissible as 
evidence of market value and no inference 
can fairly be drawn that it is correct from 
the failure of the owner to object on the 
ground that the valuation is too low.'' 
18 1\.m. J ur., Page 993, Section 350. 
Numerous cases are cited in the foot note which 
suRtain the text. There is of coursP very good rea-
son why that should be the law. It is a matter of 
common knowledge that property in this State is 
in the main assessed . at only a fractional part of 
its market value. If there were any doubt about 
that being so a comparison of the values which the 
defendant's witnesses pla.ced upon plaintiffs' land 
with the values placed thereon under the direction 
of the State Tax Commission would establish such 
to be the fact beyond controversy. J\foreover, to 
permit the assessed value of p·roperty to be ad-
mitted in evidence in the · ma.nner sou.ght by the 
defendant would have been to deprive plaintiffs of 
their right to c.ross examine those who made the 
assessments. To argue that an assessment rriade 
nnder the direction of the State Tax Commission 
stands on anv other or different basis than that of 
an as~PsRor fR 'vithout foundation in law or in fact. 
Complajnt is also ma.de because the trial court did 
not nermit plaintiff . P'aul Swartz to testify in 
greater detail as to why he became ill while he was 
residing on his prop~rty nea.r defendant's plant. 
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Atlr. Swartz testified on direct examination that the 
smell from defendant's plant was the rottenest 
srnell tha.t he had ever smelled ; that if the sn1ell 
comes when he is eating he must stop and many 
times the srrfell makes him vomit. On cross exam-
ination the defendant inquired about the health of 
Mr. S\vartz and his family. The court permitted 
defendant, over objection by plaintiffs to go into 
the question of Mr. Swartz's health and the doc-
tors he employed. (Tr. 324 to 327). If this Court 
will read the extent to which the court permitted 
counsel for the defendant to cross examine Mr. 
s,vartz about his health and that of his vvife and 
children, and as to their doctors, we feel confident 
that it will marvel at the extent to which the court 
permitted defendant to ·cross examine Mr. Swartz 
about matters that were not testified to on direct 
examination. 
On page 93 _of defendant's brief complaint is made 
because, a.s it is claimed, the trial court refused to 
permit it to offer evidence to show the sanitary 
condition of the plant. The difficulty with that 
contention is that it is contrary to the fact. In 
none of its rulings did the court deny defendant the 
right to show the condition of the plant. Mr. 
Warren E. Rasmussen testified tha.t he is a veter-
inarian; that he visited the plant once. He did 
not inform the court as to what he found at t.he 
plant, but was asked w~e.tlier or not the plant was 
sanitary. The court su~tained the objection of 
plaintiffs ,to such questiqn but expressly indicated 
to defendant that he might sho"'~ the -condition of 
the plant but that the witness Ra.smusRen V\7as not 
permitted to give his opinion upon the questio\n 
that the court must ultimately determine. Where-
upon counsel for defendant apparently hecame 
peeved .and· did noi at.trmpt to further examine tbe 
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\Yitness. It "Tould seem obvious that it is not shown 
that the 'vitness was comp~etent to testify as an ex-
pert, and if he "\Vere his testimony would be of no 
probative value in the absence of a showing of the 
facts upon which his opinion was founded. If this 
Court will take the time and have the patience to 
read the voluminous transcript it will find that the 
trial court "yas very liberal and used the utmost 
care and patience in permitting the parties, especial_ 
ly defendant, to offer all evidence that might bear 
upon the question pTesented for determination, 
and likewise allowed a wide latitude on cross ex-
amination_ If this Court can find the time and has 
the patience to read the transcrip·t it cannot well 
avoid reaching the conclusion that much of the evi-
dence received did not hear up·on the issues raised 
by the pleadings and cannot well find any. diffi-
culty in concluding that the facts found hy the 
court below are a.mply sustained by the evide-nce. 
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE SUPPORTS 
THE DAMAGES-AWARDED TO EACH O.Ji, 
THE PLAINTIFFS. 
Before taking up a specific discussion of the evi-
dence as it relates to the dan1ages sustained by each 
of the pla.intiffs a few general observations on the 
B~mount of damages common to all of the plaintiffs 
\'ill serve to avoid repetition. On pages 61 and 62 
of defendant's brief defendant makes the ingenious 
statement that plaintiffs' 'vitness depreciated the 
value of the wa.ter rights of the plaintiffs a spe-
cified p~rrPnt of the value thereof. The evidence 
does not support such aontention. Plaintiffs' wit-
ness g-ave the a.mount of depreciation in the ma.rket 
value of the various properties without attempting 
to ~eg-regnte t.he depreciation of the wa.ter from 
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the land. Indeed, it would he impossible to 1nako 
the distinction. 
While this record is silent as to whether the water 
is or is not appurtenant to the land, the fact re-
mains that in this semi-arid region land without 
water is of little or no value. That is a matter of 
common knowledge, of which courts will take judi-
cial notice. If the water were taken from the lands 
of the plaintiffs it would' result in rendering such 
land practically valueless, and especially the homes 
built thereon. Nor is any pTactical purpose served 
by fixing the dama.ge to the improvements on the 
farms of the plaintiffs as distinguished from the 
land itself. Indeed, in ·contemplation of law most 
of the improvements are a. part of the land. It is 
true that as some of the witnesses testified, the 
improvements could be removed and used else-
where. Nor is there any sound legal basis for the 
ar.gument that the owners of lands upon which im-
provements ha.ve not been constructed are not en-
titled to recover damageR. 
One who goes upon his farming lands to work is 
entitled to the right to breathe air which is not 
polluted with obnoxious odors the same as is one 
who spends both day and night upon the land. If 
one desires to build a home on his land or sell it, 
for someone else to build a home thereon, he may 
not lawfully be precluded from so doing. by one 
who is maintaining a nuisance which renders his 
land unfit for a home. In either event he is en-
titled to either have The nuisance removed or be 
compensated for the damages sustained hy reason 
of the wrong, Defendant ha.s ·cited no case or 
authority holding to the contrary and we seriously 
doubt that one can he found in the hooks where 
any such doctrine is announced. The cases in this 
jurisdiction heretofore cited are to the contrary. 
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It is a cardinal principle of law tha.t one who is 
wrongfully injured is entitled to redress. If the 
wrong cannot be prevented by injunction the in-
jured p:erson is entitled to money compensation. 
This case was, aS' we have heretofore pointed out 
in this brief, tried and determined on the theory 
that P'laintiffs are entitled to recover the amount 
that they are dama.ged by reason o{ the wrongful 
acts of the defendant. The n1ea.sure of damages 
according to the la'v announced by this Court in 
the cases heretofore cited is the depreciation in the 
market value of plaintiffs' property caused by tho 
wrongful acts of defendant. Indeed, in the absence 
of injunctive relief there is no other way of re-
dressing the wrong. 
These plaintiffs are farmers. Most of them live 
upon their fa.rms. Those who do not may we~l con• 
elude to do so were it not for the fact that the nuis· 
ance caused and maintained by defendant makes it 
impossible to live upon the land in comfort. lf 
any of them conclude that they can no longer hear 
the stench emanating fro1n defendant's plant they 
may, a.s they have a right to do, sell their lands and 
the improvements thereon a,t such a price as can 
he ohtained, which p·rice by a clear preponderance 
of the evidence .. 'vill be at a very substantial amount 
less than could be secured if defendant were not 
rnaint~ini_ng' its nuisance. It is not our contention 
tl1at plaintiffs are entitled t.o recover unless the 
evidence shows that defendant is guilty of main-
taining a. nuisB.nce. vV e concede that i.n the absence 
of a showing that defendant has committed a 
wrong recognized as such by law, plaintiffs are 
not entitled to recover, and hy the same token, 
pla.intiffs contend that if a wrong, that is, a nuis-
ance has been, now is and will in all probability he 
maintained by the defendant, the plaintiffs are 
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entitled to redress. That the defendant havi11g 
failed and refused to so use its property as uot to 
be a nuisance and insisted on continuing indetiuite-
ly to maintain a nuisance and plaintiffs having 
been denied injunctive relief, they are entitled to 
redress by the only means open to them, to recover 
damages for the injuries sustained, the measure 
of which is the depreciation in the market value of 
their property occasioned by defendant maintain .. 
ing the nuisance complained of. 
ln this connection it may be noted that there is a 
fundamental distinction between a case vvhere in 
an action involving a nuisance plaintiffs are denied 
injunctive relief because a nuisance has not been 
shown by the evidence, and a case where injunctive 
relief has been denied because plaintiffs have not 
acted timely, or where a court of equity deems an 
injunction will needlessly penalize the wrongdoer 
without a corresponding. benefit to the complainant, 
and where the complainant may he co1npensated 
in dama.ges. It may readily be conceded that if a 
cause fails because a nuisance has not been shown 
damages may not he recovered because in such case 
the defendant has done that which he has a legal 
right to do. That, however, is not this ca.se. Here 
the court found, and under the eiVidence and its 
own observation it could not well avoid finding tli.at 
a nuisance has been and will be maintained in-
definitely. Defendant having succeeded in escap-
ing injunctive relief, not because of its right to do 
what has been and will be done, hut in spite of the 
fact that it has and will continue to invade plain-
tiffs' right, must respond by paying such damages 
as flow from its wrongful act. That, as we have 
heretofore pointed out in this brief, is plaintiffR' 
theory and that is the doctrine announced by this 
Court in the Kinsman, Thackery, and other cases 
heretofore cited. 
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\Yith these general observations we shall proceed 
to a specific discussion of the evidence as it affects 
the Yarious plaintiffs. 
DJUIAGES SUSTAINED· BY THOMAS LUDLO~W 
~Ir. P. P. Thomas testified that in his opinion the 
home of Thomas Ludlow had a value of $2500.00 in 
the absence of the nlaintenance and operation of 
defendant's plant; that the other improven1ents 
had such a value in the sum of $1156.00 and the 
land $8,000.00; tha,t the damage to the home of 
~Ir. Ludlow was $500.00, to the improvements 
$230.00, to the land $800.00, making a total of 
$1530.00. (Tr. 856; Ab. 263). 
C. E. Ha,vkins placed the value of the Thomas 
Ludlow home at $3500.00, his barn and lean-to at 
$500.00 and his land at $200.00 an acre. He gave 
it as his opinion that the odor from defendant's 
plant depreciated the improven1ents on the Tho1nas 
· Ludlow property twenty-five percent, which would 
amount to $1,000.00; to the land ten percent. 
Thomas Ludlow owned forty acres of land, which 
at $200.00 an acre would be $8,000.00, ten p~ercent 
of which is $800.00, making a. total of $1800.00 
damages to the Thomas Ludlow ·property, accord-
ing to Mr. Hawkins. (Tr. 949; Ab. 295-6). 
Lawrence E. Johnson placed the value of the 
Thomas Ludlow land at $200.06 per acre and its 
depreciation in value ten percent, which for the 
forty acres would amount to $800.00. He did not 
testify about the improvements. 
Thotnas 1\f. Anderson placed the app,raised value 
of the Thomas E. Ludlow prop,erty with the pres-
Pnr(} 0-f defendant's planf ns follows: The home 
~:1.000.00; the other improvements $800.00; the 
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value of the land $200.00 per acre. He placed tho 
depreciation of the home and other improvements 
at twenty percent and the depreciation of the land 
ten percent, making a total of $1560.00. Thon1as 
FJ. Ludlow gave it as his opinion that the· fair rea~ 
sonable value of his fa.rm and improvements at 
this time is $10,000.00. He testified at considerable 
1ength as to the odors at his home, but gave notes-
timony as to the amount that his property was 
depreciated in value on account of defendant's 
plant. 
The trial court a.warded damag.es to Thomas .ffi. 
Ludlo'v in the sum of $1360. 
DAMAG-ES SUSTAINED BY EARL LUDLO·V{ 
P. P. ·Thomas testified that in his opinion the hom0. 
of Earl Ludlo'v was of the value of $2,000.00, his 
other improvem~nts $800.00, his land $200.00 per 
acre, or $4,000.00, making· a total value of $6800 
without the defendant's plant; that the da1nage to 
the home was $500.00, to the improvements $160, 
to the land $400.00, n1aking total damages of 
$960.00. C. E. I-Ia,vkins placed the vaue of the 
home at $3,000.00, the other improvements $800.00 
ll.nd the land of the value of $200.00 per a·cre. Mr. 
Hawkins placed the depreciation of the improve-
Jnents at t"\venty-fiv<?- percent and the la.nd at ten 
percent, making a.s a total of depreciation on 
account of the maintenance of defendant's plant to 
the property of Earl T_;udlow. $13'50.00. 
Thomas M. Anderson pla,ced the value of the .lDarl 
Ludlow home at $3,000, the other improvements at 
$600.00 and his land at $200.00 'an acre. He de .. 
preciated his home and improvements at twenty 
percent of their value, or $900.00, and the land 
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$400.00, or a total of $1300.00. Lawrence E. John-
son placed the value of the land of Earl Ludlo'v at 
$200.00 per acre and that the presence of the plant 
depreciated it ten percent, or a total of $400.00. 
The trial court awarded damag.es in the sum of 
$920.00. 
D.dMAGE SUSTAINED BY ED\VIN B. SELEN.b} 
f'. P. Thomas testified that he placed the value of 
the home at $1500.00, the out buildings at $805.00> 
the land at $200.00 per acre, or $3538.00, or a total 
'yalue of the property without the plant at $5843.00; 
that the value of the land and home and improve-
ments with the plant is $2665.00, a total deprecia-
tion of $B,179.00. (Ab. 262). 
Charles E. Hawkins testified that the value of Mr. 
Selene's home without the plant is $2200 · the out-
- ' buildings $800.00, the land $200.00- per acre; that 
the plant depreciated the value of the improve-
ments seventy-five percent and the land fifty p·er-
cent (A b. 291), thus according to l\fr. Hawkins' 
testimony the property "\\71as depreciated b·ecause 
of tl1e plant in the sum of $4869.00. 
Thomas M. Anderson placed the value of the .ffid-
win Selene home without the plant at $2,000.00 and 
the other improvements at $800.00, and the land 
nt $225 per acre. He testified that the improve-
ments on lVf r. Selene's land were depreciated in 
value one hundred percent on account of defend-
ant's plant and the land thirty percent. Under 
Mr. Anderson's evidence Mr. Selene was damaged 
in thP total R11m of $3993.77. 
Mr. Sf'lene testified the value of his property was 
~7.000 (_,\h. 70) hut did not testify as to the de-
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preciation in its value on account of defendant's 
plant. 
La.wrence C. Johnson /placed the value of ~Ir. 
Selene's land at $225.00 per acre and that the plant 
l1ad depreciated its value one-third, or $1326.42. 
He did not testify about the improvements. 'l'he 
·court awarded 1\fr. Selc~~e judgment for $2176.00. 
DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY ~lARGARET D. 
HANS]JN. 
P. P. r~rhomas placed the value of the hon1e of Mrs. 
Margaret D. Hansen at the sum of $3,000.00 and 
the improvements at $800.00 and the la.i1d at 
$200.00 per acre, or $5160.00. He placed the de-
preciation of the home and other improvements by 
.reason of defendant's plant, at $760.00 a.nd to tho 
land, $516.00 (A b. 263) or a total of $1276.00. 
Charles E. Hawkins placed the value of 1\irs. Ha!l-
sen 's home at $::5,000.00 and other buildings at 
$800.00 and the land at $175.00 per acre He pla.ced 
the depreciation on account of the plant on her im-
provements at twenty pe-rcent and on the land 
fifteen percent, ( ~t\b. 294), making a total of 
~1437.00. 
;rhomas M. Anderson placed the value of Mrs. 
Hansen's home at $3,000.00 and other improve-
ments at $800.00 and the land at $200.00 per acre. 
He placed the depreciation of the improvements 
at thirty percent and the land at fifteen percent 
(Ab. 315), making a total depreciation of $1554.00. 
La.wrence C. Johnson placed the value of 1\f r~~. 
Hansen's land at $225 p·er acre and the depreciation 
on account of defendant's plant at twenty per .. 
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_cent (Ab. 329) making· the damage to the land alone 
$1161. 
Heber Eug-ene Hanse~ placed the va.l:ue. of the 
property at $10,000. The trial court fixed the dam-
age of Mrs. Hansen at $1124.00. 
During the course of his testiinony, Eugene Hansen 
testified that the home, together . with nineteen 
acres and a fraction~ stood in Marga~ret· D.' Hansen's 
name and the remaining· 16 acres stood in the name 
of his fathe-r,-: Heber J. Hansen, who is dead. De-
fendant in its --brief at page 51 calls attention to 
that testimony and then points out that _the Han-
sen property was depreciated less than the prop-
erty of Earl Ludlow which \Vas twice 'as. ra:r a.way 
from the plant and about the same as. the, Tho:rpas 
E. Ludlow_ property \vhi~h "ras _ also nearly. tWice 
as far from the plant: -It may be th,at the damage 
to the _Hansen property was .. considera'bly greater 
~than that fixed- by the court,: because of the fact 
that sixteen· acre& of _that ]iroperty stood in thP 
-·name of ~eber J. Han~·en, deceased·. · 
?'I r- • 
It also appears that the prevailing ~wind in the 
locality of the plant .comes- ftom the east and moves 
· towards the west~ that the odors- are conveyed hy 
. the wind. The Ludlow properties are west of the 
plant. \Vhile thP Han sen proT10rtv is to· 1-he south of 
the plant .. If it be contended that !Irs. Hansen 
, could not· maintain a.n a.ction for-- damages to th~-\ 
property which stood in her husband's name~ sueh 
contention must fail. Upon the death of Heber 
J. Hansen the surviving widow })ecame the owner 
in her own right of an und~vided one-third interest 
~in the same. She thus had a right to maintain the 
-~action even as- to the property standing in the namP 
of Heber J. Hansen. ·Moreover; the· uefendant did 
·not in the court- below rpiRP tJie qu·estion of the in-
r.apncity of M ~rg-a-rrf D.- Hansen to maintain' thP 
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~1.ction as to the property which stood in the nan1e 
of her deceased husband. 
rrhe law is well settled that 
''ordinarily defendant waives the objec-
tion that plaintiff is not the real party in 
interest where he fails to raise it or ia.:ls 
to raise it at the proper time, as by den1ur-
rer or answer, and instead of objection on 
this ground answers to the merits. Al-
though there is authority to the contrary, 
the objection may be waived by conduct in-
dicating express content that the suit pro-
ceed.'' 
46 c. J. 191. 
'rhe case of 
Cole v. Utah Sugar Company, 35 ·utah 148; 
99 P. 681, 
supports the view that a defendant claiming that 
the cause is not proseeuted by the real party in in-
terest can only be taken advantage of by demurrer 
or answer, and if not so taken is waived. 
Page 154 of 35 Utah. 
The defendant in this case proceeded with the trial 
as though ],frs. Hansen were the real and solA 
party in interest, without in any way indicating 
that it had any objection on that ground. In such 
case the defendant waived any objection that it 
n1a.y have had to J\1rs. Hansen prosecuting the 
action. 
Cronk v. Crandall, 121 N. Y. S. 805. 
Sandee v. Tschider, 205 Fed. 252. 
In any event the evidence supports the judgment. 
in favor of Mrs. Hansen without regard to taking 
into eonsideration the land that stood in the name 
of her husband, Heber J. Hansen, deceased. 
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DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY JO·HN ANGUS 
P. P. Thomas testified that the home of John Angus 
was of the value of $1200.00 if defendant's plant 
were not there; his improvements $7 40.00 and his 
land $200.00 per acre, or $1564.00; that his home 
was damaged $240.00, the other improvements 
$150.00 and his land $350.00 (Ab. 2'64), making a 
total of $7 40.00. 
Charles E. Ha,vkins testified that the John Angus 
home has a value of $1500.00, the other improve· 
111ents $750.00, and his land $175.00 per acre, with-
out the damage of defendant's p·lant. That the im-
provements of Mr. Angus were damaged fifty per-
cent on account of the plant and the land was dam-
aged t'venty p·ercent. Under Mr. Hawkins' testi ... 
mony Mr. Angus sustained damages in the total 
sum of $1398.70 
~rho mas M. Anderson· placed the value of the home 
of John Angus at $1500.00, the other improvements 
a.t $750.00 and the land at $175.00 per a.cre. .i:Ie 
placed the damage caused by defendant's plant as 
being forty percent of the 'improvements and fif-
teen percent of the land (Ab. 317-18), or a total of 
$1205.07.' 
La,vrence C. Johnson placed the value of the John 
Angus land at $200.00 per a.cre and testified that 
in his opinion its ma.rket value was depreciated 
twenty percent on account of defendant "s plant. 
(Ab. 330). He did not testify a.s to the improve .. 
ments. The depreciatio·n of the land would thus be 
$273.70. The court awarded John Angus damages 
in the sum of $824.00. 
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D.A.lY.[AGES SUSTAINED BY JOHN AI~D~RSO.i\ 
P. P. Thomas testified that except for the injury 
-caused by defendant's plant, the J'ohn Anderson 
J1nme was of the value of $800.00, the othe1· im-
provements $250.00, his land $200.00 per acre, mak-
ing a total of $2050.00; that the damage to the home 
and improvements is $800.00; to the land $250.00 
(Ab. 262) making total damage of $1060.00. 
Charles E. Hawkins placed the value, except for 
the injury -caused by defendant's plant, of the 
home of John Anderson at $1,000.00, the out build-
ing, $300.00 and the land· at $200.00 per acre. Mr. 
Hawkins placed the damage to the improvement::; 
at seventy-five percent of their value and fifty per-
cent for the land, (Ab. 293) making total damages 
of $1475. 
Thomas M. Anderson placed the value of the John 
Anderson home at $1,000.00, the other improve-
ments $300.00 and the land $225.00 per acre, "rith-
out the injury caused by defendant's plant. He 
testified that the improvements in his opinion were 
depreciated one hundred percent and the land 
thirty percent (Ab. 313). The total injury thus 
would he $1637.50. 
The court a'varded John Anderson judgment for 
$1050.00. 
Defendant seems to -contend that John Anderson 
is not entitled to a recovery because the title to 
the property stands in his wife's na.me. John 
Anderson did testify that the property stood in his 
wife's name, but further testified that he owned the 
property. The complaint alleges and the answer 
admits that John .. Ander~on is the o"\\-Tner of the 
property described in the complaint ; see par-
a~ra.ph three of ·defendant's answer (A b. 2'4). 
There was thus no issue as to the o'vnership of thP 
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John Anderson prop·erty. Moreover, what we have 
heretofore said in this brief about the failure of 
defendant to raise any question as to Mrs. Hansen 
being the real P'arty in interest applies to John 
Anderson. It of course might well he that John 
Anderson was the owner of the property even 
though it stood in his wife's name. 
DAMAGE TO THE PRO·PERTY OF MAYLAN 
CARTER. 
P. P. Thomas placed the value of the 14.58 acres 
of land of Maylan Carter at $200.00 per a.cre, or 
a total of $3,096.00. It was his opinion that the 
property was damaged in the sum of $619.20 on 
account of defendant's plant. 
Charles E. Hawkins valued the Maylan Carter 
property at $200.00 per acre and that the damage 
caused by the plant depreciated the land fifty to 
sixty percent. At fifty p~rcent the da.ma.ges would 
amount to $1548. 
Thomas M. Anderson placed the value of the Ca.rter 
property at $225.00 per acre and its. depreciation 
on account of the plant at thirty percent (Ab. 314· 
15), or a total of $1044.90. 
Lawrence C. Johnson pla,ced the value of the Carter 
property a.t $225.00 per acre and its deprecia.tion at 
thirty .. three and onewothird percent (Ab. 328) or a 
total of $1161.00. 
}.taylan Carter testified that he paid $225.00 per 
acre for his property and in his opinion it was de· 
preciated in value on account of defendant's plant 
fifty percent, or a total of $17 41.50. 
The court fixed the dama,ge to the Carter prop ... 
o.rty at $646.00, 
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Defendant makes some point of the fact that the 
trial court dismissed the action as to Maylan 
Carter. The actiion, however, as to M.r. Ciarter 
was dismissed without prejudice. In its memo-
randum of decision dated January 6, 1940, the court 
states that it permitted the action to be reinstated 
as to the plaintiffs 1\llaylan Carter and Edward ~L 
Beck, otherwise known as R.eed Beck, the case hav-
ing been previously dismissed as to said plaintiffs 
without prejudice (Tr. 122). So long as the cause 
was still before the court, there can be no serious 
doubt that the court could change its ruling andre-
instate the cause as to Maylan Carter. Indeed, in 
the Kinsman ca.se this Court on its own motion in-
dicated that additional parties should be permitted 
to join as plaintiffs. It is of course a matter of 
common practice, if not indeed the duty, of a trial 
court when it believes its ruling is in error to cor-
rect the same while the cause is still pending be-
fore it. That is what was done by the trial court 
in this -cause as to Maylan Carter. 
DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY ED\VARD LUD~ 
LOW. 
P. P. Thomas testified that without defendant's 
plant the value of the land of Edward Ludlow is 
$225.00 per acre, or $1833.75, and it is damaged 
$611.25 by reason of the plant. ( Ab. 263). 
Charles E. Ha"\\'kins placed the value of the Ed-
ward Ludlow land at $225.00 per acre, and that de-
fendant's plant had depreciated it fifty p~ercent 
(A b. 263), or $916.87. 
Thomas M. Anderson plaeed the value of the land 
of Edwa.rd Ludlo'v without the plant at $225.00 
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per acre, or $1833.75, and placed the dep·reciation 
at thirty percent, or a total of $550.12. 
La,vrence C. Johnson placed the valu~ of the :ffid ... 
'va.rd Ludlow land 'vithout the plant at $250.00 per 
acre or $2,037.00, and the depreciation on account 
of the plant a.t one-third (Ab. 328) or a total of 
$u79.16. 
The court placed the damage at $427.87. 
Defendant attempts to make a point out of the tes .. 
timony of Ed,vard Ludlow to the effect that the 
record title is not in him. He did so state, but fur-
ther testified, however, that he held a. deed from 
his son that ha.d not been recorded (Ab. 137). It 
is of course elementary tha.t the failure to record 
a deed can have no bearing on the right of .vJd ... 
ward Ludlow to maintain this action. 
DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY RUFUS ANDER. 
SO-N. 
P. P. Thomas placed the value of the Rufus An ... 
derson home 'vithout the plant at $2250.00, the out 
buildings $1,000.00; the land $2'50.00 per acre for 
19.53 acres, or $4875; and that the total value of Mr . 
.. A.nderson 's p~roperty if the plant were not t_here 
would be $8,132.00; with the p·lant there $5157.00, 
or a total damage to the land of $975.00 and to 
the improvements $2,000, making a total of $2975.00. 
Charles E. Ha,vkins testified that without defend .. 
ant's vlant the Rufus Anderson home is worth 
$3225.00 rl,nd the other improvements $750; and the 
land $225.00 per acre; that the home and improve-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
48 
ments are depreciated seventy-five percent and the 
land fifty percent, making a total of $4607.97. 
T~omas M. Anderson placed the value of the Rufus 
Anderson home at $2300, the improvements at 
$750.00 and the land a.t $250.00 per acre, if the 
plant were not there. He testified that the im-
provements were reduced one hundred percent and 
the land about thirty percent, making· a total de-
duction of $5487.50. 
La.wrence E. Johnson placed the value of the Rufus 
Anderson prop~erty at $2.50.00 per acre and that it. 
was reduced ih value one-third, or $1628.33. Mr. 
Johnson did not testify concerning the improve-
ments. 
The court awarded damages in the sum of $2099.30. 
It appears that Mr. Anderson remodeled his home 
in 1935 at a cost of about $1400.00 (Ab. 12'0). This 
\vas the year when the cookers were placed in de-
fendant's plant. Apparently defendant contends 
that in a.ny event Mr. Anderson should not be 
allowed any depreciation to the additional value 
which he expended in remodeling his home. In 
other words, as we understand defendant, it takes 
the positio~ that Mr. Anderson was not permitted 
to assume that when defendant began cooking the 
dead carcasses and offal which it collected from 
various counties, Mr. Anderson wa.s chargeable with 
foreseeing that the defendant would continue in-
definitely to so operate its plant; that it would be 
impossible to live in his home without continuing 
to breathe the noxious odors from the plant. It is 
submitted that ~Ir. Anderson had a right to re-
model his home and that defendant may not be 
1heard to complain if it is required to compensate 
him for the vvrongs complained of. 
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DAJ\1.A.GE SUSTAINED B-Y PAUL E. SWART~ 
P. P. Thomas placed the value of the Swartz home, 
w·ithout any depreciation caused by defendant's 
plant, at $3.000.00, the out buildings at $2,000.00. 
and the land consisting of 2'9.18 acres at $200.00 
per acre. or $5835.00. He placed the depreciation 
of the home at $600.00, the out buildings at $400.00 
and the land at $583.00, on account of defendant's 
plant, making a total of $1583.00. 
Charles E. Ha"' ... kins placed the value of the Swartz 
l1ome at $3000, the outbuildings $3150 and the 
value of the land at $200.00 per acre. He testified 
the Swartz farm was dep~reciated in value twenty-
five percent and the land twenty percent Oll 
account of defendant's plant. The total deprecia-
tion of the Svvartz property according to Mr 
Hawkin~ therefore is $1917.20 
Lawrence C. Johnson valued the Swartz land at 
$200.00 per acre and placed its depreciation 1n 
value at twenty percent, or a total of $1167.00. 
The court fixed the amount of the damage tn the 
Swartz property at $1230.00. 
It will be noted that in every instance except one 
the trial court fixed the amount of damages sub-
stantially below the lowest figures given by any of 
plaintiffs' witnesses. The one exception \Vas that 
of the depreciation in the value of the John An-
derson property, in which case the court placed the 
damage at the sam8 amount as did the wit.ness 
P. P. Thomas 
The defendant ·called three witnesses, T. H. Heal 
of Provo, Wm. Parry of Springville, and Henry 
Jeppson, a contractor who resides at Payson. Heal 
and Plarry are engaged in the real estate hu~i-
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ness. These witnesses collaborated as to the valiH-~ 
of plaintiffs' property. 
Charles S. Woodward, from Salt Lake City, who :s 
engaged in the real estate business, also testified 
on behalf of the defendant. Mr. Woodward had 
been in Chicago and Kansas City and evidently 
had heard about the stock yards in those cities and 
had some notion about the effect of the stock yards 
upon real estate values. Just what bearing that 
has upon the question here presented is hard to 
determine. These witnesses) while admitting that 
obnoxious odors emanated from defendant's plant, 
testified that the market value of plaintiffs' prop~ 
erty was not depreciated in value because of such 
odors. They all placed the value of the property 
belonging to plaintiffs somcnvhat lo\ver than that 
placed upon the property by plaintiffs' witnesses. 
Plaintiffs' witnesses all lived within a few miles of 
the property in question and it appears from the 
testimony that they were familiar with such prop-
erty and ~rith the odors that emanated from de-
fendant's plant. P. P. Thomas resided at Spanish 
Fork. He is connected with the Bank of Spanish 
Fork, one at Nephi, and the one at Heber City. He 
iR familiar 'vith the lands in question and at one 
time owned one of the tracts of land. He had 
appraised and made loans on other tracts and had 
frequently experienced thP. odors coming from the 
plant. Charles E. Hawkins resided· at Benjamin 
and had been County Assessor of Utah County for 
ten years and also a.ctea as appraiser for the Des-
eret Savings Bank. Thomas M. Anderson resided 
at Lake Shore, about three and one-half mileR from 
the land in question. He wa.s an employee of the 
Spanish Fork Loan Association and had been em-
ployed by the Federal Land Bank to appra.iRe prop-
erty in the vicinity of plaintiffs' property. 
Lawrence C. Johnson resides at Benjamin about 
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three-fourths of a n1ile "Tt'st and 40 rods south of 
deft~ndant 's plant. He was a farmer by occupation 
and had experience in appraising lands in the 
vicinity of plaintiffs' lands. AU of the plaintiffs' 
'vitnesses had first hand infonnation on the nature 
and extent of the odors emanating from defend-
ant's plant since its erection. 
We have heretofore in this brief given a, short 
summary of the evidence touching the nature and 
extent of the odors coming from defendant's plant 
and shall not enlarge upon what we ha:ve said. but 
again urge the Court, if it has the 1.ime, to read 
the transcript. 'Ve also again call the attention of 
the Court to the fact that the judge 'vho tried thE: 
cause visited the plant and was invited to visit it. 
as often as he desired, but it does not a.ppea1· 
'vhether he visited the plant and its vicinity mor(J 
than once. Ho"\\~ever this (~ourt judiciallv kno-vv~ 
._, 
that Judge Hoyt resides at Nephi and is the judge 
of the Fifth Judicial District Court of this State. 
The evidence ~ho"rs that one of the main travelled 
paved highways from points south of the plant to 
points north thereof passes near the plant and it 
is a fair assumption that Judge Hoyt ha~ passed 
along that highway in coming- from his district t0 
points north of the plant. It· is not unrea~onable 
to assuine that he 'vas familiar 'vith defendant's 
plant or that upon the invitation of defendant he 
hecame familiar therewith before l1e n1ade his find-
ings of fact, conclusions of law 2nd judgment. 
}\_ hypothetical question that might properly be 
asked of an expert witness as to the effect, if any .. 
on the market value of th P property of plaintiffs by 
the operation and maintenancP of defendant's 
rlant (for the purpose of illustration Mr. Edward 
RPlPn~ '~ prouertv) "'·'·onld he sjmila.r to this: 
_;\ssnming, l\f r. vVitnPss. thnt a person is the owner 
of ] 7.69 acres of irri.rrated farm land of the value 
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of $200.00 per acre, with a home thereon of the 
value of $1500.00 and outbuildings of the value of 
$805.00, and, at a distance of about thirty rods south 
of the home a rendering plant is constructed of 
cement and brick with an open sump into which 
blood and manure from dead animals drains and is 
permitted to stand until it seeps away or evap-
orates, and the carcasses of some fifty to seventy-
five horses and cows, which have been dead one o1· 
two days, are collected at the plant per month, and 
in addition to the carcasses of cows and horses, 
dead pigs, sheep, offal. and bones are collected at 
such plant and cooked for the purpose of man-
ufacturing bone meal, fertilizers, poultry feed and 
tallow; and assuming there is also collected and 
stored at the plant from one to several tons of 
bones in which rats make their nest, and assuming 
'that the odor from the cooking of the dead an1mals 
draws flies in great numbers to the plant and such 
home, and assuming that odors emanate from the 
;plant intermittently every day and frequently at 
nights, and such odors smell like rotten meat; and 
assuming that such odors sometimes continue for 
1a.n hour and other times almost continuously and 
are so intense at times that it sickens the entire 
fa.mily and keep~s them awake all night and the 
children cry because of the odors~ and assun1ing at 
times these odors ·Continue all day and night and 
'jn the summer time the smell is stronger than in the 
winter; and assuming that when the odors come 
at meal times the people living in the home are un-
able to eat, and not infrequently the smell causes 
them to vomit; and assuming that such odorR at 
times burn your throat and are SO thick that it iA 
difficult to breathe the air and the air chokes you 
a.nd is so strong that you can almost chew the sb~ff: 
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and assuming that the smell is so strong at times 
that horses become frightened and it is difficult to 
control them; and assuming that the odors eman-
ating from the plant bring swarins of blow flies to 
the house; and assuming that when one's clothes 
have been exposed to the odor, the smell remains 
in such clothes for hours thereafter, and assuming 
that these odors are not improving, notwithstand-
~ng the owner of the plant claims that he has done 
all he can to do a\vay with the odors, and assuming 
ihat the O\vner of the plant cannot be enjoined 
from continuing the op,eration of the plant, and 
assuming that the plant is so constructed as to in--
dicate it will be operated permanently or for an in-
definite time; under these facts, 1vlr. Expert Wit-
ness, have you an opinion as to whether or not the 
maintenance and operation of such a· plant will 
affect the market value of the land and home above 
mentioned' If the answer is yes, then this ques-
tion might follow: Will the operation and main-
tenance of such a plant, under such circumstances, 
enhance or diminish the value of such a home and 
farm so located, and, if so, how much? 
Similar hypothetical questions might properly be 
~sked as to the homes and farm lands of the other 
plaintiffs. 
Defendant's witnesses would have us believe that 
1 hP property here brought in question would not 
he depreciated in value under such circu1nstances, 
and at least one of them \Vould seem to be of the 
opinion that the homes and farms might be en-
hanced in value because notwithstanding only about 
t'vo men are ·employed at the plant, the operation 
of ~nch a nlant migl1t create an industrial a.rea. W c 
pa11~0 to observe that it is not likely that an indus· 
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trial plant will seek a lo·cation where it is inlpos-
sible to live in comfort. 
Plaintiffs' witnesses testified tha.t these facts re-
sult in a substantial dep-reciation in the market 
value of the p·roperty and gave the amount of such 
depreciation. Defendant 'vould have this Court 
answer the question as did defendant's witnesses. 
notwithstanding the trial court 'vho saw the "'~it­
nesses, heard them testify and who examined the 
plant, believed that in the main plaintiffs' witnesses 
spoke the 'truth. It is submitted that the trial cour~ 
was right when he believed plaintiffs and their 
witnesses. But as we understand d~~endant it 
contends that even though plaintiffs are entitled to 
recover some damages, the award of the trial court 
is so large a.s to show that' the dam.ag:es were award-
ed a.s result of bias or prejudice on the part of the 
finder of the facts. Attention is again called to the 
fact that the trial judge substantially reduced the 
amount of the awards that were fixed by plaintiffs' 
witnesses. 
If the odors emanating from defendant's plant and 
entering the homes and outbuildings of these 
plaintiffs who live near the plant are of sucn char-
:Jcter, intensity and frequency as shown by the evi·· 
dence, it is not difficult to understand why M.r 
Anderson placed the damage to the improvements 
on some of the homes at one hundred percent and 
Mr. Hawkins placed such damag-e as hjgh as seventY-
five percent. Is it not more likely that one who had 
~ufficient funds to purchase a farm and a. home 
'vould not be interested at all in the purchase of 
such a home, or would not be 'villing to pay any-
thing like a normal value for a farm so situated 
and so infested with odors, rats. and flies~ Not in-
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frequently attractive scenery very materially adds 
to the value of a home or a farm, and it is but rea-
sonable to believe that the presence or absence of 
pure air is of vital concern to one who would pur-· 
chase a home or a farm. l\1en and 'vomen do not 
live by bread alone. They deman_d and a.re willing 
to pay more for property where they can enjoy the 
comforts of life. They may not lawfully be de-
prived of pure air and be rendered miserable by a 
plant such as that which the evidence shows has 
been, is and, as defendant insists, will be per-
manently maintained and operated, 'vithout regard 
to the discomfort or injury that it causes these 
plaintiffs. · · : : · 1 
We submit that the judgment should be affirmed 
with costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ELIAS HANSEN, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
and Respondents. 
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